It’s all about capacity
The latest report on HS2 from the National Audit Office attracted widespread media coverage.
The trigger was NAO’s realisation that the existing capacity bottleneck south of Stafford would no longer be bypassed by the new line following the October 2023 cut-backs.
This – the NAO pointed out – would undermine the key purpose of HS2 which is to increase network capacity. Without this bypass, growth of both passenger and railfreight services along this critical section of the nation’s busiest rail corridor will be halted.
Media pick up saw an implication that demand would need to be discouraged by higher prices. Concerns over customer service reliability with railway running at capacity also surfaced.
|
NAO report extract DfT will not be able to address capacity issues on the West Coast Main Line north of Birmingham through its revised programme scope. The HS2 programme was originally intended to improve capacity on the West Coast Main Line. However, the HS2 services that will run north of Birmingham will not resolve capacity issues on that section, and DfT estimates that the line could reach capacity by the mid-2030s. DfT plans for HS2 trains to run from the Phase 1 track onto the West Coast Main Line in place of conventional trains, but the trains will have fewer seats than existing services unless changes are made to existing infrastructure and stations to accommodate longer trains. Options for addressing capacity issues involve, at a high level, managing demand for rail services or investing in infrastructure such as additional tracks and longer platforms. DfT will need to balance trade-offs in developing options while considering the impact on and operation of the national railway as a whole. Source: HS2: update following cancellation of Phase 2. Department for Transport and High Speed Two Limited. National Audit Office, July 2024 |
The NAO of course has legitimate concerns around project benefits as well as costs. If ever there was a transport decision that could undermine national economic growth ambitions, here you have it.
The solution is to hand
The capacity problem was to be solved by the accelerated delivery of a small part of the second phase of HS2 – Phase 2a – which would effectively complete the new line from Euston to Crewe.
The distinctive feature of Phase 2a is that unlike any other part of the wider HS2 project which included plans to Manchester (onwards from Crewe) and Leeds (via the East Midlands) it already has Parliamentary powers in place.
As noted by the NAO, it is at the design stage, with early enabling works underway. But as of March 2023, DfT paused the start of any major construction work on this section for two years “to manage inflationary pressures”.
It is perhaps ironic that this part of the project was taking a new approach to project oversight designed to better manage project cost inflation. But, following the October 2023 decisions, DfT’s general principle was “to stop work where it was no longer required for Phase 1 unless it would cost more to stop or change plans.” No work is now being done on Phase 2a as a consequence.
For a Government with an economic growth mission, letting Phase 2a lie fallow for two years (at which time its parliamentary powers would lapse, so back to square 1) makes no sense, and as we suggest here, risks a lost decade of better transport connectivity for north west England, north Wales and Scotland.
The lack of joined-up planning must be brought to an end
The NAO report confirms what many had suspected of the October 2023 cut-backs:
“these decisions impact HS2 Ltd, but also Network Rail as the operator of the conventional railway and West Coast Partnership as the organisation running existing services on the West Coast Main Line and future high-speed services. These organisations had not been involved with the scope changes announced in October 2023.”
This would be laughable were it not so damaging to the nation’s transport system. The lesson should be learned: HS2 is a project designed from the outset to relieve foreseeable pressures on the national transport network. To achieve this aim, its specification and its delivery need strategic oversight and the involvement of the operators of the nations’ rail network and services.
It is one thing to conclude that the full project (to Manchester and Leeds) has become unaffordable, but it is another matter entirely if what is left delivers little benefit of value on a national scale.
Completion between Euston and Birmingham and the Phase 2a link that connects the West Midlands to the North will be of real value and will come to be cherished, as a key part of the nation’s infrastructure.
The need for timely decisions
There are some options around Phase 2a – see https://www.greengauge21.net/a-leap-in-the-dark/ – and these centre on possible cost savings and choices on the southern approaches to Crewe. It may well be that some shortening of the new line, once past the bottlenecks between Colwich and Stafford could develop useful capital cost savings, and money saved could be allocated to the currently unfunded improvements needed at Crewe station itself.
But it should be remembered that Parliamentary powers for new rail infrastructure are not obtained speedily. The decision to separate out and accelerate the West Midlands-Crewe section of HS2 was taken ten years ago. Of course other ideas should be considered, but insofar as they require fresh powers, likely timescale implications also need to be recognised.
As a future NAO report would no doubt confirm, a protracted planning period with changes to any approved scheme adds costs and defers benefits. Better to have Crewe-London completed than lose a decade of delivery on the nation’s growth agenda.
Meanwhile, with nothing happening on ‘Phase 2a’ for the NAO to assess, there is a risk that work on this essential part of HS2, costing (the NAO estimates) around £1bn to date, will be wasted.
It needn’t be and shouldn’t be.